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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE or UTAH 
KAREN R. HOFMANN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ELIZABETH S. SULLIVAN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 16265 
This is an action to collect damages from Defendant's sale of her 
condominium, which had been previo~sly leased to Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the hearing of Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions for Summary 
Judgment, it was stipulated that no facts were in issue. The Court determined 
that the lease between the parties granted a conditional first right of refusal 
to Plaintiff to re-lease, or to buy in the event Defendant decided to sell, be-
fore or at the end of the lease period. 
However, since there was no lease or sale at the expiration of the 
lease, Plaintiff's conditional right did not accrue. The Court said that the 
right did not indefinitely continue to any date in the future when Defendant 
might decide to sell or lease. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied, and Defendant's 
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cross motion granted. 
RELIEF SOUGET ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Summary Judgment. Defendant ask 
for an affirmance. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Court is familiar with this case, Plaintiff having appealed 
Judge Bryant H. Croft's decision at the trial which denied Plaintiff's first 
Complaint, Case No. 15742. 
The lease agreement between the parties granted Plaintiff a first 
right of refusal in re-leasing or buying the property at the expiration of the 
lease, on October 14, 1977. 
"13. Upon expiration of this lease, the Lessee 
shall have first right of refusal in signing of 
a lease for this premises, and first right of 
refusal in acceptance of the sale of said prem-
ises." 
The facts are undisputed that Defendant notified the Plaintiff on 
October 5, 1977, that she would not be leasing or selling the property at the 
expiration of the current lease, as she needed the condominium for family use, 
and consequently, the first right. of refusal would not arise. In spite of this 
notice, Plaintiff filed a Complaint to force Defendant to sell, and was denied 
specific performance or damages after trial, November 22, 1977. Defendant's 
Counterclaim for unlawful detainer was also denied. Plaintiff thereafter moved 
out. Later, when the family problem had straightened, Defendant decided to sell 
on January 13, 1978. Plaintiff again filed a Complaint to force an alleged 
continuing right of first refusal at whatever time Defendant sold or again leased 
her property. 
Judge Durham decided such a right as Plaintiff asserts was an un-
tenable limitation on Defendant's right to dispose of theproperty (Page 2, 
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Paragraph 2, lines 6 and 7 of Judge Durham's Memorandum Decision dated Decembe 
28, 1978).Defendant was granted a summary judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL TO A LEASE OR SALE 
IS CONDITIONAL UPON THE GRANTOR'S DESIRE 
TO LEASE OR SELL 
Appellant agrees and Utah cases confirm the point of law that a 
first right of refusal is conditional upon the Grant's desire to sell or lease. 
A Utah case is cited in American Jurisprudence (49 Am Jur 2d 384, 
368) for this holding. Chournos v. Evona Investment Company, 97 Utah 335, 93 
P 2d 450, concerns a lease giving the co-tenants the first opportunity to pur-
chase the leased land for the price lessor would receive from other parties. 
Such a provision did not constitute an option without the lessor's notice that 
he desired to sell. 
When the lessor did give notice, it was well before the lease ter-
minated. Chournos then tried to exercise his first opportunity, but his exer-
cise was not according to the lease terms. He sought a unilateral, rather than 
a joint exercise with his co-tenant. The Court denied his complaint for specific 
performance. 
Applying this law to our facts, the Sullivan lease also had a pro-
vision giving a first right of refusal, which could develop into an option had 
the lessor given notice that she desired to sell -- on the contrary, before 
the lease terminated, she gave notice that she did not dr~sire to sell or lease 
again. The conditional first right did not accrue. 
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POINT II 
THE DURATION OF A RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL TO A LEASE 
OR SALE DEPENDS UPON THE TERMS EXPRESSED 
Ill nm LEASE PROVISION 
The general rule is that all rights and provisions in a lease are 
terminated at the end of the lease term. (10 ALR 2d 885). The rationale is 
that the lease, its covenants and considerations, are interwoven and indivisib. 
and they are so dependent on each other that the lease is essential to enforce 
ment of rights under it. 
1'1vtl,cr or not this general rule applies to a narrower issue such 
the duration of a specific right of refusal, depends upon the express terms in 
the particular clause or the instrument granting the right. 
The case which appellant cites, Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 
548 P 2d 889, discusses this point: 
"In this instance, for the purpose of determining 
whether this right of refusal survived the termin-
ation of the lease, we think the same rule applies 
as that which governs options contained in leases: 
that is, if by the express terms of the option, it 
can be seen as independent of the other covenants 
of the lease, and is supported by a valid consid-
eration, it can continue ... " (Russell, pp. 891, 892) 
The Court cited Chournos approvingly, and looked at the lease lan· 
guage. The grant in the Russell lease is expressed as "during the entire ten: 
of the lease." However, thelease was forfeited and prematurely terminated. Th< 
Court held that the Russell right of first refusal was intended as an integra'. 
part of the total composite of the lease; and when the lease was forfeited ani 
terminated, this covenant fell with it. (Russell, p. 892.) 
Thus, the authority Appellant cites is contrary to the point she 
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asserts. The first right of refusal in Russell terminated with the lease. 
Appellant also relies on Cummings v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 129 p 
619 (1912) which dealt with personal property rather than realty, and also is 
distinguished from our case in that the agreement stated no limit of time. 
Therefore, Cummings does not control here. 
Turning now to our Sullivan lease, paragraph 13 grants the first 
right of refusal "upon the expiration of this lease." Reading that clause 
with the next paragraph 14, the lease says, "Upon the expiration of the lease 
(or before if mutually agreed upon) ... ",the lessee can purchase at a certain 
price. 
This language sets forth two conditions: 
1. If mutually agreed upon, and 
2. Upon expiration of the lease or before. 
At the happening of the one event, i.e., the expiration of the lease, 
the other condition did not happen. There was no mutual agreement. The right 
ceased by the terms of the provisions creating it. Appellant contends the right 
sprang into being at the expiration of the lease and continued indefinitely 
thereafter. However, the lease language controls. The right was in existence 
before the expiration (if the parties agree) and upon the expiration. Nowhere 
does it say, after expiration. The lease expired and so did the first right. 
POINT III 
THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL TO A LEASE OR SALE 
SHOULD NOT SURVIVE THE LEASE TERM, AS A 
MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY, ABSENT 
EXPRESS PROVISION TO THE CONTRARY. 
A conti.nuing first right of refusal to a lease or sale in all lessees 
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under the standard residential leases would create havoc in the area of land-
lord ownership rights. The lease used by the parties was patterned after a 
standard residential lease of Prowswood. 
It would be ludicrous to have such a right exist in lessee after 
a termination of the lease, after a complaint for unlawful detainer, as in thi 
case, after non-payment of rent, and even after abandonment of the premises 
by lessee. 
As Judge Durham stated, "It certainly could not be argued that if 
at any time, no matter how distant in the future, Defendant desires to lease 
again, she would nave: to lease it to Plaintiff." (Memorandum Decision, Op. ci: 
lines 13-16) The right of first refusal to lease goes hand in hand with the 
right of first refusal to sell. If one terminates at the expiration of the le 
so does the other. 
POINT IV 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ARE TO BE PAID 
BY PLAINTIFF AS PROVIDED BY CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
Attorney's fees are allowed when authorized by statute or by the 
express terms of a contract, Cliff v. Culmer, 556 P 2d 498 (1976) Utah, Blake 
v. Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369. 
Where the lease provides that the lessee shall pay attorney's fee' 
in an action to enforce the lease, the lessee was indeed found liable in 
Milliner v. Farmer, 471 P 2d 151, 24 Utah 2d 326, over the objection that the 
right to recover attorney's fees expired at termination of this lease. 
The lease agreement of the parties signed by the Plaintiff requirl 
her as lessee, to pay for the services of an attorney and costs in an action 
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"9. Should the lessor be required to employe the 
service of an attorney to enforce performance of 
this agreement or be compelled to sustain action 
at law to collect said rents or for any other 
cause, the lessee shall pay all costs in connec-
tion therewith." 
Plaintiff instigated this action and has pursued for 20 months. 
She is seeking damages under the lease, and should be bound by the provisions 
for attorney's fees. A reasonable attorney's fee for the many appearances and 
voluminous paper work this case has engendered is suggested at $2,500.00 or 
other amount the Court deems reasonable. The District Court did not consider 
this issue in the Memorandum Granting Summary Judgment. 
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SUMMARY 
The issue of law is whether or not a first right of refusal to sign 
a new lease or accept a sale of the premises upon the expir ation of the lease 
continues beyond that expiration, beyond a trial determining the rights of each 
party under the lease, and beyond the abandonment of the premises by lessee, 
to an indefinite time in the future whenever the owner may desire to sell or 
lease. 
To allow such a continuing right in the lessee is an untenable lim-
itation on the rights of the owner to dispose of his property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Carol B. Olson of 
ROBINSON, GUYON, SUMMERHAYS & BARNES 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
1220 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered the originals of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief to the Court, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and 2 copies of the same to the Attorney for Appellant, James R. Soper, 400 Ten 
Broadway Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, on the /5 day of May, 1979. 
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